NTSB Preliminary Report Details High-Speed Landing, Missing Wind Information Before Miami 767 Overrun

MIAMI — The Boeing 767 operating 21 Air (2I) Flight 7598 touched down about 3,750 feet (1,140m) beyond the Runway 30 threshold at roughly 160 knots groundspeed before its fatal September 6 overrun at Miami International Airport (MIA), according to the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) preliminary report.

The report also says the Air Traffic Controller cleared the flight to land without providing wind information required when a tailwind component exists. About four minutes earlier, the controller had told another flight that winds were from 190 degrees at 19 knots, gusting to 22 knots. Flight 7598 was not on that frequency at the time.

The aircraft, registered N1997A, was operating a cargo flight for Amazon from Luis Muñoz Marín International Airport (SJU) in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Five people on the ground were killed and three were seriously injured when the aircraft struck two vehicles. Both crewmembers sustained minor injuries, the NTSB said. The findings remain preliminary and do not determine the accident's cause.

Approach and Touchdown

The Captain was the pilot flying and the First Officer was monitoring. Using flight data recorder and aircraft surveillance data, investigators placed the aircraft about 105 feet (32m) above ground level as it crossed the threshold at 177 knots groundspeed.

Initial main landing gear tire marks were found about 3,750 feet and 3,820 feet (1,160m) beyond the threshold. The NTSB places the aircraft at about 160 knots groundspeed there, roughly 13 seconds after threshold crossing.

The landing gear weight-on-wheels signal then switched intermittently between air and ground for about seven seconds. It remained on ground for the rest of the recording once the aircraft had about 2,730 feet (830m) of runway remaining. These measurements describe the recorded landing sequence; they do not establish why the touchdown occurred at that point.

The cockpit voice recorder summary identifies the First Officer as the Pilot who warned that the aircraft was too fast when the Captain called for flaps 20. The First Officer continued commenting on excessive speed. The report records no consistent verbal response to those comments. The summary also records sink-rate and terrain warnings during the approach.

The speeds reported in the reconstruction are groundspeeds. The report does not set out 21 Air's stabilized-approach criteria or a company-required go-around threshold, so those figures alone do not establish compliance with its procedures.

Go-Around Call After Touchdown

Airways previously reported the brief throttle increase and renewed braking disclosed in September. The preliminary report now places those actions against the runway distance remaining.

Wheel brakes were applied manually at 146 knots groundspeed. About eight seconds later, the brake pedals were released at 120 knots and both engines' recorded throttle angles increased to values consistent with go-around thrust. About 930 feet (280m) of runway remained. The voice recorder summary lists the Captain's go-around call after touchdown.

About four seconds after the throttle increase, both recorded throttle angles returned to idle and wheel braking resumed at 117 knots, with about 415 feet (125m) of runway remaining. The aircraft crossed the runway end at 113 knots. Its final recorded groundspeed was 65 knots, shortly after it struck the airport perimeter fence and crossed a public road; that was not its stopping speed.

The NTSB says the speed brakes remained stowed and the thrust reversers did not deploy during landing and rollout. The report does not establish whether those systems were commanded, unavailable or unselected.

Wind Information and Further Analysis

The NTSB cites Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Order JO 7110.65BB as requiring wind direction and velocity when authorizing runway use with a tailwind component. It records that the controller omitted that information from Flight 7598's landing clearance and that the flight was not on the frequency for the earlier wind advisory.

The earlier transmission and the weather observation near the accident are separate records. At 13:53 EDT, Miami's automated weather report recorded winds from 190 degrees at 17 knots, gusting to 26 knots. The preliminary report does not determine how the wind-information omission affected the crew's decisions or the outcome.

The reported runway positions show how little distance remained during the throttle and brake changes. The NTSB says an aircraft-performance study will combine recorder and other engineering data to refine the sequence and analyze the aircraft's physical state during approach and landing. The Flight 7598 investigation page, updated October 1, lists the case as ongoing.