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DALLAS — The aviation industry in Europe has come together to address the growing problem of jamming and spoofing of global satellite positioning systems. Over 120 industry representatives from airlines, system suppliers, ANSPs, and other institutions attended an event in Cologne, Germany, where measures were agreed upon.
According to the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), there has been an increase in Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) jamming and spoofing incidents worldwide, particularly in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, resulting in up to 80 nm deviation from the flight path and affected aircraft having to rely on radar vectors from ATC. These recent incidents involving spoofing are indicative of an active attack on an aircraft’s total navigation system.
The GNSS relies on satellite constellations like the US Global Positioning System (GPS) and the EU's Galileo to provide aircraft with Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) services. GPS jamming involves blocking the GNSS signal, while spoofing sends false information to disrupt flights. Although technical solutions have been developed, equipment suppliers and GNSS providers are engaged in a constant battle to provide resilience against attacks.
GPS spoofing involves overriding legitimate GPS satellite signals to deceive receiver antennae and manipulate their navigation systems, in effect overriding legitimate GPS satellite signals. This can lead to incorrect positioning information, potentially causing aircraft to deviate from their intended routes or experience navigational failures. Strategically, spoofing can indicate that an aircraft is somewhere it is not, leading to a complete loss of navigational capability.
Immediate Actions
EASA had already warned of satellite outages near Ukraine as early as March 2022. The national aviation authorities in Europe have now tasked the safety agency to develop measures to counter the risks posed by spoofing and jamming. The recent event, organized in collaboration with the International Air Transport Association (IATA), concluded that short-, medium-, and long-term measures are needed to mitigate the risks.
Immediate actions include sharing incident information and remedies, ensuring pilots and crews are aware of the risks and know how to react safely, and adapting certification requirements for navigation and landing systems in the medium term. In the long term, involvement in the design of future satellite navigation systems is crucial.
EASA and IATA are continuing discussions to establish an initiative for reporting and sharing spoofing and jamming data in Europe and globally. The aim is to collect and share GNSS safety data, provide procedural guidance for GNSS incidents, and retain traditional navigation systems as backup in cases of GNSS disruption.
To address these challenges, aircraft OEMs will provide more guidance on managing jamming and spoofing situations, and EASA will establish an alerting system to inform airlines, ANSPs, and airports about attacks. The cooperation of airlines, governmental authorities, and industry stakeholders is essential to effectively tackle this issue and ensure the safety of aviation operations.
Featured image: Lufthansa - Airbus A319-100 - D-AIBI (Star Alliance special scheme) - EDDF/FRA. Photo: Julian Schöpfer/Airways
https://airwaysmag.com/how-geopolitics-affect-aircraft-nav/
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