Controllers Who Left LaGuardia Early Were Scheduled Past Fatal Collision, AP Reports

NEW YORK — Two LaGuardia Airport (LGA) air traffic controllers allegedly left work about an hour early on March 22 even though their shifts extended beyond the fatal runway collision later that night, The Associated Press (AP) reported, citing an unnamed government official familiar with the matter.

Their departures left two controllers in the tower, the official told AP. Weather-delayed traffic was heavier than scheduled that night, and the tower was simultaneously handling an emergency involving another aircraft. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has not concluded that the early departures caused or contributed to the collision.

What the New Reporting Establishes

The two controllers who left were scheduled to remain at the airport past 23:37 EDT, when Air Canada Express Flight AC8646 struck an airport fire truck while landing on runway 4, according to AP. The official said they could have provided backup as the tower became busy.

Earlier accounts of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) disciplinary case did not establish that the two were scheduled past the collision. The agency is pursuing action up to termination, the official told AP. In a statement to the news agency, the FAA said it "is committed to holding employees accountable" and would not compromise the safety or efficiency of the national airspace system.

The AP account does not provide the controllers' exact scheduled end times, identify which tower positions they would have worked, or say whether a supervisor authorized their departures.

The National Air Traffic Controllers Association said it "is actively discussing these allegations with FAA leadership." AP also reported that experts and retired officials described leaving when a required break falls at the end of a shift as a common national practice known as an "early shove." Neither AP's account nor the FAA's statement describes action against the practice beyond the two LaGuardia cases.

How the Tower Work Was Divided

The NTSB's preliminary report records two controllers on duty at the time of the collision, consistent with the facility's mid-shift basic watch schedule. Both were qualified and current on all control positions at LaGuardia. The report does not address the two earlier departures.

One controller was assigned local control, with responsibility that included arrivals, departures, and runway surfaces. The second worked ground control and served as controller-in-charge.

Before the collision, the ground controller/controller-in-charge was coordinating a ground emergency at terminal B involving an aircraft that had made two rejected takeoffs. That work included communications with the aircraft, ramp operations, and aircraft rescue and firefighting crews. The local controller took over transmitting instructions on both the local and ground frequencies while that response continued.

AP reported that weather delays had pushed the number of arrivals and departures after 22:00 to more than twice the scheduled level, citing aviation analytics company Cirium. Twelve flights arrived between 23:00 and the collision, a span of less than 40 minutes.

Airways reported in March on the NTSB's examination of why the local controller was not immediately relieved after the collision.

Why the Fire Truck Did Not Trigger an Alert

The surveillance limitation extended beyond the truck involved in the collision. According to the NTSB, none of the seven responding vehicles—six rescue and firefighting vehicles and one Port Authority police vehicle—carried transponders.

LaGuardia's Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model X intermittently displayed some of the vehicles as radar targets. Without transponders, however, the system could not identify and reliably track each one, correlate the fire truck's path with the landing aircraft, or predict the conflict. An FAA review of the system data, recorded in the preliminary report, found that it produced no visual or aural alert for controllers. Airways explained after the collision how transponders feed airport surface surveillance.

Red runway entrance lights at the taxiway D intersection did illuminate. ASDE-X activates those lights automatically as an aircraft approaches a runway, warning traffic waiting on the taxiway, and they stayed on until about the time the fire truck reached the runway edge, roughly three seconds before the collision. The system is designed to switch them off two to three seconds before a landing aircraft reaches each intersection, the preliminary report says.

Neither the preliminary report nor AP's account says whether all LaGuardia emergency vehicles now carry transponders, or identifies a retrofit timeline.

What Remains Under Investigation

The NTSB has established a sequence, not a probable cause. The local controller cleared "Truck 1 and company" to cross runway 4 at 23:37:04, when the CRJ-900 was about 130 ft above the ground on final approach. The controller issued stop instructions at 23:37:12 and again at 23:37:20. The collision followed about two seconds after the aircraft's nose gear touched down.

Flight AC8646 was operated by Jazz Aviation (QK) for Air Canada (AC), using a CRJ-900 registered C-GNJZ from Montréal–Trudeau International Airport (YUL). Seventy-six people were aboard, and two Port Authority firefighters were in the truck. Both pilots were killed. Across the aircraft and vehicle, 39 people were taken to hospitals, six with serious injuries.

Investigation DCA26MA161 remains open. Probable cause and any contributing factors remain undetermined, and the preliminary report is subject to change.