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NEW YORK — In the upcoming episode of The Airways Podcast, hosts Rohan Anand and Vinay Bhaskara move from summer travel notes into three strategic stories shaping the next phase of global aviation: SAS’ (SK) long-haul fleet order and Copenhagen (CPH) hub strategy, the possible private-equity takeover of easyJet (U2), and American Airlines’ (AA) decision to resume Chicago O’Hare (ORD)–Tokyo Narita (NRT) service.
1. SAS: Copenhagen becomes the center of gravity
The first major topic is SAS’ (SK) widebody order: 18 Airbus A330-900neos, plus 12 used A330-300s as interim lift. For Rohan and Vinay, the order is more than a fleet renewal story—it is a strategic reset under SAS’ new position inside the Air France-KLM (AF/KL) orbit.
Historically, SAS had to balance three national identities and three hub airports: Copenhagen (CPH), Stockholm Arlanda (ARN), and Oslo (OSL). That made sense when SK operated as a Scandinavian consortium serving Denmark, Sweden, and Norway with roughly comparable importance. But in a post-restructuring world, and now as part of the broader AF-KL/SkyTeam ecosystem, the logic changes.
Vinay’s core point is that CPH is the best-positioned Scandinavian hub geographically. It sits far enough south to serve as a realistic connecting point into continental Europe, the Nordics, Eastern Europe, and potentially parts of Asia and the Middle East. ARN and OSL remain important local markets, but they are less efficient as broad connecting hubs.
The A330neo order therefore signals a pivot away from the dream of multiple long-haul Scandinavian gateways and toward one larger, more integrated CPH hub. That matters because SAS can now complement Paris Charles de Gaulle (CDG) and Amsterdam Schiphol (AMS), rather than compete internally across three Nordic hubs.
2. The A321LR/XLR promise meets reality
The SAS discussion also becomes a broader conversation about the Airbus A321LR and A321XLR. Several years ago, the promise of long-range narrowbodies suggested airlines like SAS could support thinner transatlantic routes from markets such as OSL, ARN, or secondary Scandinavian cities.
But the hosts argue that the aircraft’s practical performance window has not fully matched the most optimistic early expectations. For SAS, the A321LR/XLR can support some transatlantic flying, especially into the Northeast U.S. and Canada, but it cannot replace the network power of widebodies operating through a real hub.
That helps explain why the A330neo order matters. Instead of betting mainly on smaller point-to-point long-haul routes, SK is doubling down on CPH as a widebody hub that can connect flows across Scandinavia, Europe, North America, and beyond.
3. India, Amsterdam, and the SkyTeam network map
Rohan raises India as a key question for SAS, especially given SK’s attempt to serve Mumbai (BOM) and its long absence from Delhi (DEL). The discussion places that India strategy in the context of AF, KL, Virgin Atlantic (VS), and the transatlantic joint venture.
Vinay’s broader observation is that AMS has historically played an outsized role as a connecting hub for SkyTeam flows—especially from the U.S. into Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and India. But with AMS facing operational, environmental, and political pressure, CPH could become a useful “backup” or complementary hub for selected flows.
That does not mean CPH replaces AMS. It does mean SAS could help diversify the network. CPH is especially useful for traffic to Scandinavia, the Baltics, Poland, parts of Eastern Europe, and eventually Asia if Russian overflight restrictions ease.
In practical terms, that could create opportunities for more North America–CPH flying, including potential Delta (DL) growth from hubs such as Detroit (DTW), Salt Lake City (SLC), Seattle (SEA), or even additional U.S. focus markets. The episode frames CPH as a strategic triangle point alongside CDG and AMS—not just a regional Scandinavian base.
4. easyJet: private equity sees the value under the airline
The second major story is easyJet (U2), where U.S. investment firm Castlelake is reportedly pursuing a takeover. Rohan outlines the structure: earlier bids were rejected, a sweeter offer emerged, and regulatory complexity remains because EU airline ownership rules require majority EU ownership and control.
For Vinay, the most interesting part is not simply whether U2 is undervalued. It is whether easyJet’s assets may be worth more in pieces than as a single airline.
Unlike Ryanair (FR), which has built much of its model around secondary airports, easyJet has meaningful positions at major or strategically constrained airports such as London Gatwick (LGW), Amsterdam (AMS), Lisbon (LIS), Geneva (GVA), Milan Malpensa (MXP), Paris Charles de Gaulle (CDG), Manchester (MAN), and others.
Those slots, gates, aircraft, and operating certificates are valuable. easyJet also has multiple operating structures—easyJet UK, easyJet Europe, and easyJet Switzerland—which raises the question of whether a private-equity owner would try to run the airline better, split pieces apart, sell assets, or reshape capacity around the most profitable bases.
Rohan’s instinct is that private equity would likely focus on extracting asset value. Vinay adds nuance: not all private equity behaves the same way. Some investors, such as Indigo Partners, have built repeatable airline models at carriers like Frontier (F9), Wizz Air (W6), Volaris (Y4), and JetSMART (JA). But easyJet’s airport portfolio makes it uniquely tempting as an asset play.
5. American returns to Chicago–Tokyo Narita
The final big topic is American Airlines’ (AA) plan to resume Chicago O’Hare (ORD)–Tokyo Narita (NRT), restoring a route it operated for decades before cutting its Chicago–Asia network around the early pandemic period.
Rohan frames the route as part of AA trying to regain relevance at ORD. It supports a 787 presence, gives the Chicago market another AA long-haul route beyond London Heathrow (LHR), and strengthens the Japan Airlines (JL) joint venture. It also puts American back into a market where United (UA), All Nippon Airways (NH), and JL have long been central players.
Vinay pushes back against the idea that the route is a “nothing burger.” Yes, this may partly replace JL metal, and yes, the aircraft may be coming from cuts elsewhere, including Philadelphia (PHL)–Doha (DOH). But an AA-operated transpacific route from ORD is still strategically meaningful. It gives AA customers in Chicago a nonstop option to Tokyo and a one-stop pathway into Asia via JL’s network.
The hosts also place ORD–NRT in historical context. Chicago–Tokyo has been contested for decades, from the era of Pan Am and Northwest to United’s eventual strength in the market. American launched ORD–Tokyo service in the late 1990s and operated it for more than 20 years. Bringing it back is not a revolutionary move—but it is a sign that AA is no longer content to surrender Chicago’s long-haul narrative entirely to UA.
6. What else can American do in Asia?
The ORD–NRT discussion becomes a broader question about American’s transpacific strategy. AA has strong joint ventures with JL and Qantas (QF), but its own Asian network remains thin compared with United’s (UA) San Francisco (SFO) operation or Delta’s (DL) renewed interest in Asia through Seattle (SEA) and Los Angeles (LAX).
Rohan argues that AA may be better off relying on partners rather than adding its own metal into crowded or weak-yielding markets. China demand is not what it was, Hong Kong (HKG) is already served by Cathay Pacific (CX), and Seoul (ICN) or other Northeast Asia routes may face operational challenges tied to Russian airspace restrictions.
Vinay notes that AA’s bigger structural problem is geography. Its strongest hubs—Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW), Charlotte (CLT), Miami (MIA), Phoenix (PHX), Philadelphia (PHL), and Washington National (DCA)—are powerful domestically, but not always ideal for global long-haul demand. Meanwhile, AA is weaker in the very coastal/global markets that drive the most premium international traffic: New York (JFK/LGA), Los Angeles (LAX), and Chicago (ORD).
That is why ORD–NRT matters. It does not solve the entire Asia problem, but it is a step toward making AA more credible in a hub where it still has scale, history, and a reason to fight.
Airways analysis
This episode is really about hub discipline. SAS (SK) is choosing Copenhagen (CPH) over a three-hub Scandinavian compromise. Air France-KLM (AF/KL) is gaining another tool to balance pressure at Amsterdam (AMS) and strengthen SkyTeam flows. easyJet (U2) is attractive because its airport positions may be more valuable than its current public-market valuation suggests. And American (AA), by restoring ORD–NRT, is trying to show that it still has a role in Chicago’s long-haul future.
The common thread: airlines are no longer chasing growth everywhere. They are choosing where to concentrate scarce aircraft, slots, capital, and premium demand. In 2026, the winners are not necessarily the carriers with the most dots on the map—they are the ones that understand which hubs still deserve widebody bets.
The Airways Podcast is hosted by aviation analysts Rohan Anand and Vinay Bhaskara and produced by Airways Digital Editor Helwing Villamizar. New episodes are available across major podcast platforms.
Featured image: Airways
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